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Nationalist reframing of the Finnish and Swedish welfare state: the nexus of nationalism 
and social policy in far-right populist parties 
 
Abstract 
 
The rise of right wing populist parties in the Nordic countries is slowly redefining the Nordic 
social democratic discourse of the universal and egalitarian welfare state. The nexus of 
nationalism and social policy has been explored in regions and countries such as Quebec, 
Scotland, Belgium and the United Kingdom but the change of discourse in the Nordic countries 
has received less attention. Taking the case of Sweden and Finland, this paper argues that Nordic 
populism does not question the redistributive welfare state per se as many other European neo-
liberal far-right parties have done. Instead it reframes welfare state as being linked to a sovereign 
and exclusive Swedish and Finnish political community with distinct national boundaries. 
Although Sweden and Finland largely share a common welfare nation state discourse, the article 
also points to important differences in the way this discourse is able to frame the welfare nation 
state where access to and the design of social services are no longer universal and egalitarian but 
based around ethnicity. The article aims to demonstrate this through an analysis of the welfare 
discourses of two populist parties: the Sweden Democrats and the True Finns. 
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Introduction  
 
The rise of new rightist populist parties in Europe joining the parliament and sometimes even 
government in countries such as Denmark (Dansk Folkeparti), Sweden (Sverigedemokraterna), 
Finland (Perussuomalaiset), Belgium (Vlaams Belang), Austria (Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs) and Netherlands (Partij Voor de Vrijheid) has created a new dynamic in 
understanding citizenship in terms of re-defining the boundaries between citizens and non-
citizens. This right wing movement can also be seen as challenging the European welfare state 
tradition by re-defining it as the welfare nation state.  
 Béland and Lecours have researched the linkages between nationalism and social policy 
in Canada, the United Kingdom and Belgium (2005; 2008), while Kpessa, Béland and Lecours 
studied Sub-Saharan Africa (2011). Most of the research on nationalism and social policy has 
been focused on developed, multinational states (Banting 2005; McEwen 2006; Boychuk 2008; 
Béland and Lecours 2008). Alesina and Glaeser in turn have argued that ‘racial heterogeneity’ in 
the United States explains why it has such a weak redistributive welfare state. People are more 
likely to look favorably on their own group and for this reason the rather limited redistribution of 
resources in the Unites States has been linked to views on minorities (2004). Taylor-Gooby has 
contested this by arguing that the nature of welfare programmes has been more correlated with 
the strength of left-wing parties than ethnic heterogeneity (2005). Gerdes goes even further and 
suggests that in Danish municipalities there has been no link between the number of immigrants 
and public spending (2011). Despite this, Nordic populist parties are voicing their support for a 
vision where access to welfare is based on ethnic belonging and national borders. The Danish 
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People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) and the Norwegian Progress Party (Framstegspartiet) both 
support welfare discourses that aim to protect the welfare state from the drain of immigration 
(Rydgren 2007: 486; Kestilä and Söderlund 2007). We have decided to focus on Finland and 
Sweden because they demonstrate the most variance within the Nordic cluster across two critical 
dimensions. First, the Finnish far right is the most actively Eurosceptic of the Nordic far-right 
movements, whilst in Sweden the far right has been comparatively the least vocal on Eurosceptic 
issues. Second, Finland’s welfare state is the least developed of social democratic welfare states, 
whilst Sweden is often regarded as the most developed, indeed the ideal type of the social 
democratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
In both Finland and Sweden we can identify a populist right wing discourse that brings 
together welfare and the nation state. This article argues that the welfare nation state plays an 
increasingly important role in populist parties as these parties thrive on the threat of immigration 
and the perceived loss of national sovereignty. We argue that this style of populism does not 
question a redistributive welfare state; rather it reframes welfare state as being linked to a 
sovereign and exclusive political community with distinct national boundaries. 
 Whilst the paper argues that there is a shared populist discourse around the welfare nation 
state in Finland and Sweden, it also points to important national differences in the way this 
discourse frames the welfare nation state. The article aims to demonstrate these similarities and 
differences through a discourse analysis of the two dominant populist parties in Sweden and 
Finland – the Sweden Democrats and the True Finns – and their efforts at reframing the welfare 
state in terms of the nation state. While both parties define the welfare state through a narrow, 
nationalist lens, they focus on different aspects of the nation state: the True Finns focus their 
rhetoric on the perceived threats to Finland’s sovereignty, the European Union in particular while 
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the Sweden Democrats focus on the perceived threats that are related to immigration and the 
ethnic makeup of the population. 
This is not wholly surprising: only Finland is part of the Eurozone where the recent 
financial crisis has fueled an emphatically Eurosceptic public discourse, while over 15 per cent 
of Swedish population is foreign born, compared with less than 4 per cent in Finland 
(Tilastokeskus 2014;  Svenska Statistika Centralbyrån 2014). Even if each case represents a 
somewhat different emphasis on welfare and the nation state we argue that together they 
represent a new welfare nation state populism that cherishes homogeneity while pursuing an 
active and redistributive welfare strategy that reinforces national sovereignty. 
 
Background 
A key focus of the academic research around political rhetoric far-right parties has been centered 
on anti-immigration and many contemporary far-right parties actively express their discontent 
about immigration and ethnic diversity (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008; Van der Brug 2003). 
Far-right parties have often been understood as ‘anti-immigration parties’ (Rink et al. 2009; Van 
der Brug et al. 2000, 2005) and ‘movements of exclusion’ (Rydgren 2005). Recent research has 
shown that far-right parties are not just driven by xenophobia and scepticism about immigration 
but possess a critical attitude towards mainstream politics in general (Rydgren 2007) and have 
begun to develop mainstream political agendas on issues such as the welfare state (Banting 2010: 
798; Rydgren 2004: 486) and the European Union (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Szerbiack and 
Taggart 2008; Raunio 2008; Aylott 2008).  
Another set of academic interests has centred on the redistributive policies of the far 
right. The new rightist parties ‘do not necessarily adopt typical rightist stances when it comes to 
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issues of economic redistribution and the state’ and these ‘parties are not by definition opposed 
to high levels of economic redistribution from the rich to the poor, economic interference by the 
state, and an extensive welfare state’ (Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal 2013: 4). Koster, 
Achterberg and Van der Waal claim that new rightist parties’ social agenda is to emphasise the 
interests of the native ‘common man’ (2013: 4). Despite its gendered tone, we will use the phrase 
‘common man’ throughout the article as this is used in the literature to describe the target 
audience of right-wing populism.  
 Often the far-right rhetoric amalgamates the two aforementioned arguments. New rightist 
parties not only argue against welfare for foreigners but also criticise the way welfare is arranged 
and delivered in a manner that neglects the interests of the ‘common man’.  For example, the 
perception that the needs of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants are prioritized over those of 
‘natives’ is common across the globe (Spinney and Nethery 2013).  These parties claim that ‘the 
welfare state is not adequately aimed at helping poor common people who are “really” in need 
and hence deserving of assistance’ and that the ‘welfare state, instead, provides well-paid and 
comfortable jobs for self-interested civil servants who cater to a class of “welfare scroungers” 
that freeload on the hard work of the “common man”’ (Koster, Achterberg and Van der Waal 
2013: 6). This gives momentum for an exclusive and exclusionist welfare state that favours 
ethnic nationals. Such ideas have been branded as welfare chauvinism, implying a strong support 
for economic redistribution with resistance toward distributing welfare services to immigrants 
(Van der Waal et al. 2010). Andersen and Bjorklund summarise welfare chauvinism with the 
description that ‘welfare services should be restricted to our own’ (1990: 212). These parties 
suggest they represent a more genuine form of economic egalitarianism, protecting the interests 
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of the ‘common man’ (Betz 1994; Meny and Surel 2000) that challenges the mainstream 
rhetoric. 
This method of presenting the populist politics, we argue in this paper, represents a 
reframing of the populist political rhetoric through the concept of a welfare nation state among 
Scandinavian populist parties. But what does this mean? In what sense does the addition of the 
word ‘nation’ invite us to rethink the character of the welfare state? The nation state has been 
understood since the peace treaty at Westphalia 1648 as the dominant political community and 
could be understood as the dominant political entity and primary political community but it could 
also be understood as an entity of solidarity among people who may never meet face-to-face. It 
created what Anderson has defined as an imagined community (1983) where community is not 
based around face-to-face interactions but on a more abstract idea, creating a bond of solidarity 
among people who do not have to meet up. ‘National identity suggests some kind of perceived or 
felt homogeneity – whatever people consider as uniting (e.g. a shared language, value system, 
institutional framework or just the idea of ‘us’ against ‘them’)’ (Hjerm and Schnabel 2012: 347). 
The nation state is therefore the most important arena for solidarity among citizens. ‘[T]he nation 
state became one of the most important organizational entities for social solidarity, because it 
provided the fundamentals of a political identity and social morals, which underpin redistributive 
social security systems’ (Mau and Burkhardt 2009: 214). Wagner and Zimmermann call this 
process the ‘nationalization of solidaristic practices’ (2003: 254). 
In the context of present-day nation states welfare is a key arena for the performance of 
such solidaristic practices. Kpessa, Béland, Lecours have highlighted how social programmes 
such as health care, education and income support play a vital role in strengthening the national 
community defined by the state (2011). They argue that welfare programmes imply a mechanism 
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of ‘inclusion and exclusion that allow them to build the “in-group” of national community’ and 
that welfare creates bonds and solidarity (2011: 2118). Blyth also suggests that the social 
democratic welfare state plays a major role in the development of national identity (2002: 123). 
We argue in this article that populist parties in Finland and Sweden move away from both a 
universal social democratic and a neo-liberal economic framing of the welfare state and hereby 
introduce a third framing of the welfare state: the welfare nation state. This in itself is not a new 
phenomenon since social policy and welfare have often been directly linked to nationalism. What 
is new is the adoption of these arguments by the far right in Finland and Sweden. 
 
Conceptual framework: The framing of Nordic far-right political discourse 
This paper deals with social policy from a critical interpretative policy perspective. Interpretative 
policy analysis diverges from mainstream positivist policy analysis by focusing on how policy 
actors interact and looking at the ‘the social meaning of policies and the practices in which this 
meaning is embedded’ (Durnova and Zittoun 2011: 103). Moreover, such a perspective seeks to 
‘develop a deeper, interpretative understanding of policy practices and policy process in general, 
having extended their scope over time to include perspectives on discourse, narration, 
governmentality and practice’ (2011: 103). This article takes a similar approach to understanding 
how populist parties frame Nordic states and how this framing is conveyed through a heady mix 
of nationalism and welfare populism. 
 The focus lies in the framing of policies in different discourses, an approach often used in 
policy research (Compare Béland 2009; Béland and Cox 2011; Blyth 2002; Cox 2001; Hall 
1993; Hansen and King 2001; Padamsee 2009).  
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 This article suggests that populist parties are reframing the Nordic universal and 
egalitarian welfare state according to a nationalist and ethnic focus; hence the prioritization of 
access to welfare (access to social citizenship) and the self-determination of the state (national 
sovereignty) within the discourse. By framing we are referring to something that ‘transcends the 
boundaries of agenda setting’ which is often linked to ‘stable ideological repertoires’ (Béland 
2005: 2). One could say that the framing process is a ‘strategic and deliberate activity aimed at 
generating public support for specific policy ideas’ (Béland 2005: 11). 
 Political actors use framing to convince the population or audience to support a particular 
policy alternative (Béland 2005). The need for policymakers to frame issues using culturally 
accepted repertoires shows that public opinion is important (Burstein 1998). Béland argues 
further that ‘frames are dialogical in nature: they anticipate what potential opponents could say to 
undermine the support for specific policy alternatives’ (2005: 11). Béland points out that it is 
important to ‘frame a policy programme in a politically—and culturally— acceptable and 
desirable manner (which) is a key factor that can help explain why some policy alternatives 
triumph over others’ (2005: 12). The most dominant framings of the Finnish and the Swedish 
welfare state have been social democratic and neo-liberal which have neglected the recent rise of 
nationalist alternative reframing of social policy by the far right. 
 
The rationale for the comparison  
We have chosen Finland and Sweden since both of these countries have had recent populist 
success in the national parliament in the form of the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats. 
What makes them interesting is the different electoral strategies that led to this success. The True 
Finns focused primarily on Euroscepticism where the Sweden Democrats focused on 
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immigration and multi-culturalism. Yet, despite these differences, we argue that these two parties 
share a common reframing of social policy in general and the welfare state in particular that is 
ethnic and nationalist in character, centered around an ethnic and national welfare state. 
 Moreover, in comparing Finland and Sweden we are comparing the two most different 
welfare states within the Nordic cluster. While Sweden has been regarded as the ideal social 
democratic welfare state, with long history of universal welfare services, it was only in the 1980s 
that Finland’s approach to welfare could be characterized as adhering to the social democratic 
model (Esping-Andersen 1990; Anttonen and Sipilä 2000).  The severe financial crisis that hit 
Finland in the early 1990s meant that statutory provision in areas such as health, pensions and 
childcare were noticeably curtailed, meaning that the Finnish version of the social democratic 
welfare state has again become more limited in its coverage (Anttonen and Sipilä 2000: 92). 
Therefore, in the Nordic context the Swedish and Finnish approaches to the welfare state are the 
furthest apart and it is these differences that make Finland and Sweden a particularly useful 
country comparison, as we are able to identify similar welfare nation state discourses among 
both Finnish and Swedish far-right political parties. 
Since our aim is to demonstrate the nationalist reframing of the welfare state by the far-
right, the article focuses on key documentation published by the True Finns and Sweden 
Democrats. The main core of our analysis is based on documents published between 2009 and 
2012, with emphasis on election documentation such as manifestos. These public documents 
highlight the growth of nationalist reframing of welfare policies as well as the mainstreaming of 
far right party rhetoric that has taken place during this period of time.   
The analysis of the Sweden Democrats discourse has focused mainly on the following 
four core documents: 99 förslag för ett bättre Sverige: Sverigedemokraternas kontrakt med 
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väljarna 2010 – 2014 (99 suggestions for a better Sweden: Sweden Democrats contracts with the 
voters 2010 – 2014) published 2010; Sverige Demokraternas Principprogram (Sweden 
Democrats Principle Manifesto) published in 2011;  Arbetsmarknadspolitiskt Inriktningsprogram 
(Manifesto for Active Labour Market Policy) published in 2011; and Stora besparingar till följd 
av minskad invandring (Large savings due to decreased immigration) published in 2012.  
The analysis of True Finn discourse has been based on the analysis of the following four 
documents: Perussuomalaisten EU-vaaliohjelma (True Finns’ European Election Programme) 
published in 2009; Perussuomalaisten eduskuntavaaliohjelma (True Finn’s Parliamentary 
Election Programme) published in 2011; The True Finns’ Election Programme (an English 
version of the party manifesto) published in 2011; and Perussuomalaisten Yleisohjelma (The 
True Finns’ General Manifesto) published in 1995. We have had following rationale in choosing 
these public documents for our main analysis. First, these are public documents used in election 
campaigns that give an insight to the opinions and attitudes held by the political party in 
question. Second, these documents therefore tell us of what the priority issues are for the given 
party with regards to welfare reform. Third, these documents are aimed to persuade voters and 
are therefore carefully crafted to highlight those issues that communicate the clearest message 
about the identity of the party. 
An additional focus of the research has been on recently published interviews and 
opinion pieces from leading party members that further clarify the party positions on welfare and 
nationalism. The criteria for selecting such documents for analysis had to do with their relevance 
in demonstrating the welfare state attitudes and policies of the far-right parties.  
These sources are used as evidence to demonstrate the way the True Finns and Sweden 
Democrats communicate and frame their discourse around a series of antagonistic positions. As 
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we unpack the nationalist framing of the welfare state, we focus on two such positions emerging 
from these documents. First of all, we demonstrate how the existing welfare state policy is 
problematized  through a nativist perspective, and second, how the solution the welfare state 
problem can be found through a nationalist reframing of the welfare state. 
As both Sweden Democrats and the True Finns rely on a populist framework they are 
framing their politics in contrast to the established elitist politics that they claim dominate the 
national discourse. A populist discourse depends on a dichotomy between the neglected interests 
of the ‘common man’ which have been sacrificed for the interests of the elite groups in society. 
Both Sweden Democrats and True Finns frame some of the contemporary issues into a narrative 
that describes how dominant national elitist have given into external interests (such as economic 
globalization, immigration and Europeanization) to further their own position in society, 
weakening the nation state and the homogeneity of the national society. Therefore the solution is 
actively to strengthen the nation state. This solution requires an active reframing of areas such as 
the welfare state in national terms; hence the national welfare state regime. This narrative also 
suggests that populist parties are the sole representatives of the ‘common man’ and national 
interest against the elitist and external interests. Table 1 below presents the framing of interests 
by these two populist parties, depicting the elite being at odds with the rest of society.  
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 Common man interest Elite interest 
External interest Conflict - economic globalization, 
immigration and Europeanization are  
threats that undermine the nation state  
Congruent - elites have used 
external interests (globalization, 
immigration, EU) to further their 
own interests and power.  
National interest Congruent - cultural homogeneity and 
national sovereignty is in the interest of 
the common man which protects their 
culture, autonomy and economy.   
Conflict - elites have neglected 
the interests of the nation through 
EU polices, giving in to 
globalization and/or opening up 
the borders for immigrants.  
Table 1 
True Finns 
 
The True Finns is the most recent reincarnation of a populist party representing the radical right 
in Finland. It has been modelled on its predecessor, the Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun 
Puolue) that framed its political agenda around the interests of the rural smallholders and other 
groups whose interests were not served by actions of the political elite, such as the urban 
working class. Although it lacks the xenophobic extremism that characterises the Danish 
People’s Party and the Sweden Democrats, True Finns stand in support of a mix of traditional 
conservative and nativist values that locates it firmly in among the populist radical right parties 
of Europe (Arter 2010). The overall policy rhetoric of the True Finns aims to garner support for a 
more nationalistic understanding of the Finnish welfare state. As Arter points out, the pivotal 
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concept in the True Finn ideology is ‘the notion of (true) Finnishness’ (2010: 502), an idea that 
informs much of the True Finn perception of Finland’s future. This section demonstrates how the 
True Finns, guided by this notion of Finnishness, generate an alternative ideological frame that 
challenges the current reading of social rights and social citizenship in the Finnish context. 
 First of all, the True Finn party supports a nativist position where a policy of ethnic 
homogeneity and protection of Finnish culture and values from multiculturalism form the 
preferred policy. Second, the True Finns adhere to traditional conservative values that emphasize 
law and order, tougher punishments for public drug and alcohol offences and traditional family 
values as key sources of social solidarity and cohesion. Third, the True Finn policies see their 
role as defending the Finnish welfare state model from welfare retrenchment enacted by 
successive Finnish governments. Finally, the Eurosceptic discourse within the party forms an 
important part of the overall framing of the threat the True Finns believe the Finnish state is 
facing. Together, these four aspects of the True Finn political discourse put forward an 
alternative, nationalistic framing of the problems and solutions that surround the Finnish welfare 
state, the key aspects of which are summarized in table 2: 
 
 Common interest Elite interest 
External interest The True Finns speak of the 
protection of Finnish cultural 
values and the national community 
from the artificial societies created 
by immigration as well as from the 
European Union that is diluting 
The True Finns argue that the 
European Union is a project dreamed 
up by the political elite that fails to 
benefit the majority of Finns. 
Moreover, it is also a project that 
been beneficial for the elite which 
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Finnish sovereignty.   have gained from the  integration.  
National interest According to the True Finns, 
protection of health care, care for 
the elderly and family care must be 
defended. Finnish culture is the 
‘gift’ of Finland to the world that 
must also be protected.  
Multiculturalism favored by the 
political elite is leading to 
‘ghettoization’ of communities in the 
larger suburban centres, and leads to 
an overly lenient attitude towards 
non-work-based immigration. 
Table 2 
The problem: political elite ignores public interest on European issues and immigration policy 
 
The gradual growth of the Eurosceptic discourse has been a particularly salient feature of the 
True Finns’ welfare state critique in recent years. The early policy documents, which make only 
a brief mention of the European Union, (Perussuomalaiset, 1995), contrast starkly with the 2011 
election manifesto where critique of the European Union runs to several paragraphs 
(Perussuomalaiset 2011a). Whilst economic reasons do also play a part, the key objection is 
framed in terms of protecting Finland’s national sovereignty. The combined effect of the EU, the 
True Finns argue, is to water down Finland’s ability to determine its own policies, which in turn 
threatens both the political and cultural sovereignty of Finland (Perussuomalaiset 2011a, 2011b). 
The EU is not democratic, and does not ‘support rule by the people’, and because of this the 
voice of Finland is not going to have its rightful say in EU policy or be able to protect its national 
sovereignty. Moreover, the True Finns criticize policies that belittle the shared Finnish culture, 
such as the free movement of people, that leave citizens less able to feel part of a single ‘national 
community’ (Perussuomalaiset 2009). Key objection to the EU is therefore framed in socio-
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cultural terms as presenting an external threat to Finnish culture and sovereignty.  For the True 
Finns, the Eurosceptic position has been a very visible method of problematizing the current 
political arrangements through a nationalist lens. 
The critique of the actions of the political elite is not limited to EU policy, however. The 
party rhetoric attacks the ‘elitism’ of the political class on multiple fronts, suggesting that the 
public sector and the system for providing public services is being gradually eroded by the 
ongoing reforms. True Finns are firmly in support of the traditional strong Nordic welfare state 
model where health, elderly and family care must prioritize the role of the state 
(Perussuomalaiset 2011a).  
 Another policy area where the problems with the current system are often demonstrated 
is that of immigration. The official party policy carefully distinguishes between ‘neutral’ and 
‘bad’ immigration, accepting the positive contribution of highly skilled immigrants while 
highlighting others as a potential drain on the Finnish economy. Immigration is not a problem on 
the whole, but at the same time Finland should remain vigilant against non-work-based 
immigration. In particular, the party raises concerns over multiculturalism and the trend of 
‘ghettoization’ it sees taking place elsewhere in Europe as a consequence of this policy. 
Immigrants move to the suburbs of the larger cities and create ‘artificial societies’ that have little 
contact with ‘normal society’ and fail to learn the Finnish language (Perussuomalaiset 2011a). At 
the far end of the scale we find commentators such as Jussi Halla-Aho, a member of parliament 
for the True Finns, who is highly critical of the impact of immigration and its liberal defenders. 
In his blog he draws a correlation between immigration and an increase in the number of rapes. 
Halla-Aho comments: 
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Since more and more women are going to be raped in any case, I hope and pray that the 
victims randomly selected by these predators would be the right women. The leftists-
green do-gooders and their constituents. Rather them than someone else. They are not 
going to react to anything other than the fact that multiculturalism comes home to roost. 
(Halla-Aho 2006, cf. Aden 2009) 
 
It is in these ways that the ethno-nationalist and socio-economic arguments blend in the True 
Finn policy as it carefully frames the discussions of immigration.  
 
The solution: welfare nativism to protect Finnish culture and families 
 
Ethno-nationalism is the key idea that holds together the national welfare state rhetoric for the 
True Finns. A document outlining the core values of the True Finns states this in no uncertain 
terms: ‘Finnishness is a strength’ (Suomalaisuus on voima) (Perussuomalaiset 2011a). Indeed, as 
the name of the party intimates, the values underpinning most policies can be found in Finnish 
history and culture. For this reason, multiculturalism cannot replace Finnish national identity, 
which the True Finns regard Finland’s ‘gift’ (lahja) to the world. The True Finn values aim to 
highlight the uniqueness of Finland and being Finnish, and strengthen the common national 
identity that is the ‘basis of the social contract’. It is in this context that the role of the Finnish 
language is highlighted as an important aspect of cultural heritage in need of protection. The 
protection of Finnishness and Finnish culture is an important rationale informing the True Finns’ 
approach to social policy more generally. For example, the motto ‘When in Rome, do as the 
Roman’s do’ can be found in the 2011 manifesto, alluding to the importance of cultural and legal 
17 
 
norms that ought to inform immigration and integration policy. It further opines that ‘[n]ormal 
immigrants value the same things as normal Finns: reasonable taxes, good education, social 
harmony and security. Bad immigration chips away at the base of these attractions’ (2011a: 40).  
 In addition, the True Finn discourse identifies with traditional conservative values, in 
particular with traditional, ethno-national family values. For example, for the True Finns the 
solution to Finland’s ageing population can be found in a stronger family policy that supports 
young families rather than following the ‘odd’ (erikoista) current policy that imports immigrant 
workers (2011a: 23). The True Finns are in support of a ‘traditional’ family unit where both 
parents – mother and father – are present. More broadly, the support for traditional family values 
can also be identified in the party’s support for religious teaching at schools, which should not be 
watered down (2011b). The current welfare system, the True Finns argue, fails to offer adequate 
support to families, and to young families in particular who are at their ‘best child-bearing age’ 
(parhaassa hedelmällisyysiässä) (2011a: 23). 
 True Finns support the idea of a universal welfare state. Access and the ability of people 
to make claims on the welfare state are seen as critical pillars of democracy. However, for the 
True Finns the current state of welfare represents the demands of elitist democracy that is more 
concerned with the opinions of experts. This is one aspect of re-framing the current system as 
broken: it is failing the working class. The second aspect of this re-framing is the way in which 
the proposed remedy is framed in terms of national welfare state that protects the interests of the 
everyday Finn by protecting the political and cultural sovereignty of Finland.  
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Sweden Democrats  
The Sweden Democrats is a relatively young party. It was founded in 1988 as a successor to the 
Sweden party which itself was a merger between two right wing parties in 1986. The Swedish 
progress party (Framstegspartiet) and Keep Sweden Swedish (Bevara Sverige Svenskt) joined up 
forces (Compare Rydgren 2011).  The party spent much of the late 1990s cutting the links to 
extreme groups and becoming a more respectable mainstream party. When Jimmy Åkesson took 
over the party in 2005 the party aimed to emulate the successes of the Danish People’s Party and 
enter the national parliament. In the election in 2006 the party received 2.9 percent of the votes 
in the national election and 280 mandates in municipal councils. At that point the party failed to 
reach the election threshold of 4 percent. In the election 2010 the party achieved considerable 
success with 5.7 percent of the national vote, which gave them 20 seats in the Swedish 
parliament and 612 mandates in municipal councils (compare Rydgren 2011). 
 The party focuses on the national identity of Sweden and the composition of the 
population. Rydgren states that this rests on a relationship between the Swedish people and its 
culture. Sweden Democrats ideology is based on linking people and culture to the concept of the 
nation state. The party takes for granted that each nation embodies one ethnically determined 
culture. Sweden Democrats have a nostalgic relationship to the past where Sweden was a more 
homogenous society (Rydgren 2003). The party sees itself as above the divide between left and 
right – it focus just as much on traditional right wing issues such as law and order, nationalism, 
protecting heritage as it focus on safeguarding the welfare state, looking after the old and 
protecting the environment. 
  The party wants to safeguard the Swedish welfare state and argues that tax reductions 
should never happen at the detriment of the Swedish Welfare state. In many ways the Sweden 
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Democrats are a populist party with right wing elements (nationalism, nation state, xenophobia, 
security) but their party programme also contains certain Nordic values such as strong support 
for the Swedish welfare state and opposition to the death penalty. The four aspects of the Sweden 
Democrats’ political discourse are summarized in table 3: 
 
 Common man interest Elite interest 
External interest Sweden democrats argue that it is 
in the national interest to limit the 
flow of immigrants to Sweden 
since this will protect the Swedish 
culture, welfare state, labor market 
and reduce crime. The external 
interests of other cultures should 
be curtailed. This would then mean 
that Swedish will be supported 
more through better welfare, better 
access to employment and safety. 
Sweden Democrats argues that by 
implementing a multi-cultural society 
the elite have given in to interests of 
other cultures and in particular Islam. 
This has lead to a neglect of 
commoners interest in promoting a 
Swedish identity, promote 
employment for Swedes, curtail 
immigrants abuse of welfare system, 
protect Swedes from crime committed 
by immigrants and allow employers 
to introduce foreign workers to 
compete with Swedish works. 
National interest The Swedish Democratic Party 
argues that it is in the interest of 
the common man to uphold the 
nation state as a territory governed 
by dominant nation and culture. 
Political and cultural influence 
from abroad should be limited to 
different degrees. On the other side 
Sweden Democrats are for global 
free trade which makes their stand 
ambiguous. 
The Swedish “multiculturalist” 
political elite is defined as being run 
by an ideology and therefore ignores 
the nation state. This elite has become 
a political class that is supported by 
mainstream media that ignores that 
the nation state is undermined by 
immigration and multi-culturalism. 
The elite are therefore accused for 
being against the interest of the nation 
state. 
Table 3  
 
The problem: elitist multiculturalism is a threat to the Swedish society 
 
The Sweden Democrats argue that the contemporary problem of Sweden is the ruling elite that 
abandons the interest of the common man and national interests for the sake of their own and 
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external interests. They claim to have been victims of a dominant elitist discourse in Sweden that 
is dominated by the political and media elites. The party argues that this order favours approved, 
internationally oriented politicians and their elite positions in society (Sverigedemokraterna 
2002).  
 The party perceive the dominant political class as a threat because of its support for mass 
immigration. The party argues that this political class has implemented an irresponsible 
immigration policy designed to create a ‘multicultural society’ which has led to new ethnic 
minorities living in Sweden who do not define themselves as Swedish or as being part of 
Swedish history or culture (Sverigedemokraterna 2002). The populist aspect of Sweden 
Democrats is to represent the voice of the common man in Sweden. The greatest threat of 
multiculturalism is the acceptance of Islam and here Sweden Democrats go rather far in 
describing Islam as a national threat. A debate article in the Swedish daily Aftonbladet by the 
party leader Jimmie Åkesson (2009) frames ‘Muslims’ as the greatest ‘foreign’ (utländska) 
threat, leading to Sweden and Europe becoming Islamized and under threat from Sharia law. 
 The Sweden Democrats also suggest that immigrants induce large economic costs onto 
Swedish society and the Swedish people. The framing of immigrants as a cost and a burden is 
very much the dominant perception where the party argues that immigrants tend to be 
unemployed and heavily reliant on the welfare state. Moreover, the negative impact of 
immigration on the labour market is often highlighted.  
 Sweden Democrats argue that the ‘free work immigration that was introduced in 2008’ 
has placed a great strain on the labour market. It has meant that Swedes have been pushed out of 
jobs and wages have been reduced. ‘What happened in practice was that one transferred all 
responsibility to employers when it came to work immigration of people from outside the 
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EU/EEA’ (Sweden Democrats 2011b). The party argues that this has led to low wages for people 
in the service industry in particular. The party also highlights that programmes that promote 
positive discrimination towards immigrants on the labour markets is a hurdle for Swedish 
workers. It is therefore assumed that immigrants lead to higher costs as well as lower salaries for 
Swedish workers and a decline in the labour market. There is an implicit criticism of employers 
and their self-interest in keeping wages low. 
 A large part of the rhetoric has focused on immigrants not just as being religious 
fundamentalists and a cost to society but also prone to crime. The safety of the average citizen 
has been neglected in order to protect the immigrants. Immigrants are often portrayed by the 
Sweden Democrats to have particularly significant role in violent and sexual crime, as the 
following advertisement from 1996 shows: ‘Drugs…Violence…AIDS…Crime… Immigration… 
Do you like living in the multicultural society?’ (cited in Rydgren 2011:25). 
 
The solution: prioritize welfare support for Swedes  
 
The Sweden Democrats resists a multi-cultural society where their main aim is to protect 
Swedish national identity. The party argues that immigration must be kept so low that it does not 
threaten the national identity, the welfare state or the security (trygghet) of the Swedish people. 
The party states that one needs to limit the amount of asylum seekers to a minimum according to 
the UNs refugees’ convention. They should only stay as long as they are threatened in their home 
country.  The party also states that it is better to help the asylum seekers in their home country 
instead of allowing them into Sweden (Sverigedemokraterna 2011a).  
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 Sweden should be a nation state and its welfare state ought to be first and foremost for 
the Swedes. ‘In our Sweden we help people in distress but the Swedish welfare and the well-
being of the country will be the first priority. In our Sweden there will be responsible 
immigration politics.’ The party therefore argues for a reduction in the number of asylum-seekers 
and relatives of immigrants entering the country to the levels found in neighbouring Denmark 
and Finland. The party also demands assimilation of immigrants rather than integration 
(Sverigedemokraterna 2011a). The Sweden Democrats also argue that jobs in the Swedish labour 
market should go first and foremost to Swedish nationals. Temporary visas should be given to 
immigrants to fill gaps in the labour market but the party insists that such workers should return 
home afterwards. The labour market should be influenced by the nation and the nation state. 
 The Sweden Democrats have therefore included cutting spending on asylum and 
immigrants as an important part of their budget proposals. They argued in 2012, with widely 
disputed calculations, that the net cost of new immigration is 119 billion Swedish Kronor while 
immigrants use social services 1.5 times more than ethnic Swedes. Additionally, here we 
encounter the argument that a reduction in the number of immigrants will lead to an overall 
improvement of the nation state and its citizens (Sverigedemokraterna 2012). ‘All political 
activity is about creating priorities and it is up to ourselves to decide where we want our common 
resources to go. Sweden Democrats have shown that one can through immigration politics free 
up resources that could be used to lower tax pressures and raise welfare’ (Sverigedemokraterna 
2012). 
 Key policies for the Sweden Democrats include not only restrictions on immigration but 
also initiatives to support people to leave Sweden, arguing that ‘there should be an active and 
generous support to be given to immigrants who wish to return to their home countries’ 
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(Sverigedemokraterna 2010). The restrictive measures would also mean that Swedish citizenship 
should be harder to attain where citizenship would require a 10-year residency. The Sweden 
Democrats believe in a multicultural world based on the nation state where territorial boundaries 
highlight the geographic area of a specific nation. They argue that a cultural diversity is 
important but that cultures should be kept apart in order for them to thrive. In the words of the 
party secretary, the Sweden Democrats argue further that it is important to strengthen the 
Swedish nation state. ‘In our Sweden, Sweden is allowed to be just Sweden, and its inhabitants 
are allowed to be just Swedish. In our Sweden the Swedish people have the power, through 
elections, to shape their own common future. In our Sweden the Swedish parliament is the 
highest decision-making body’ (Sverigedemokraterna 2010).  
 
Analysis 
We argue that populist parties are reframing social citizenship within a welfare nation state 
where the lack of sovereignty and expansive access to social rights are framed as a threat. Both 
the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats propose a welfare nation state as a guiding discourse 
for their policies where the sovereignty and exclusivity of Swedes and Finns in a more globalised 
and inter-connected world is protected.   
 This is not to say there are no differences. The most salient distinction relates to the role 
played by Eurosceptic attitudes and the nature of the anti-immigration rhetoric. In the Finnish 
case, the European Union plays a very significant role in the process of developing a distinct 
party identity for the True Finns. In the Swedish case, the critique of multiculturalism and anti-
immigrant policies is articulated much more strongly. However, these differences should be seen 
more as ‘background noise’ rather than substantive ideological differences because the two 
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parties are aiming to claim different types of political space among the mainstream parties. In the 
case of Sweden, Euroscepticism has been firmly rooted in mainstream politics for a long time 
(Aylott 2008) while in Finland only a few years ago the analysis of Euroscepticism focused on 
explaining the absence of Euroscepticism (Raunio 2008). It should therefore not come as a 
surprise that the populist right wing parties in the two countries are likely to adopt different 
political strategies. The second difference relates to the prevalence and frequency of the anti-
immigrant narrative in the party rhetoric. Whilst present in both cases, in the Swedish case it 
takes a more salient role in the overall rhetoric. We argue that this is again a symptom of 
different circumstances rather than a substantive difference in the underlining ideology.   
 Through the case studies, we have essayed to present a populist political strategy that 
falls along two sets of axes. On the one hand this strategy is strongly in support of the interests of 
the ‘common man’, which are seen to align with the broader national interests of autonomy, 
cultural homogeneity and national sovereignty. Moreover, this ‘common man’ position is used to 
problematize the external interests that prioritise globalization, Europeanization and 
immigration. On the other hand, the populist political rhetoric presents the political and 
economic elite as neglecting the national interests of the working classes. The elites’ preference 
for globalization and immigration threatens the interests of the average citizen whose welfare, 
culture and autonomy are challenged by these external threats. Thus,  as shown in table 4, it is 
the juxtaposition of the national and the external domains on top of a narrative that compares the 
‘common man’ against the elites that generates the rhetorical momentum of the Finnish and 
Swedish populist movements.  
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Common-man nationalism Elitist globalization 
Sovereign nation state 
Strengthening of borders 
Strong link between citizens and social rights 
Homogenous societies based within national 
borders 
Loss of sovereignty 
Blurring of borders 
Loss of  exclusive social rights for citizens 
Multicultural societies based around  
European Union 
Table 4 
 
 Still one needs to see the rise of a new rightist populist discourse around the welfare 
nation state as being in direct opposition with the overall development of welfare and social 
policy in Europe. First, social policy has often been framed as being universalist and egalitarian, 
and in this sense creating a citizenship of its own. Some take this further and argue that social 
benefits and social policy could create a citizenship in countries that had ethnic diversity 
(Compare Leibfried and Pierson 2000; Obinger et al. 2005). However, at the same time many 
scholars describe the Nordic universal and egalitarian system as one that is creating social 
services that are de-coupled from nationality or ethnic origin. Universal welfare services should 
not discriminate any citizens (Rothstein and Stolle 2003:196). There is even the argument that 
welfare states create a citizenship that is independent of ethnic, religious and racial lines 
(compare Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). 
 Sweden and Finland have followed the same trajectory with most European countries 
where social policy has focused less and less on national citizenship in the granting of social 
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rights. Residency has often replaced legal citizenship as the grounds for access to social services. 
Since the 1950s and 60s there has been a gradual ‘denationalization of solidarity practices’ where 
people with permanent residency have access to a wide range of citizenship rights (Mau and 
Burkhardt 2009: 214). With a continuing integration of the European nation states, the 
sovereignty of nations has been confronted by a more federal and less nationalistic system of 
decision making. Therefore, the reaction against access to social policy on the bases of domicile, 
as it is the case for immigrants, is largely based on the fact that the vision of welfare being based 
on citizenship is being challenged (Sainsbury 2006). The integration into the EU has led to a loss 
of sovereignty on social issues, which has played a large role in both cases and in the rhetoric of 
the True Finns in particular.  
The dominant understanding of social policy has become disconnected from the ethnic 
origin of the nation state. As social citizenship has become more and more de-nationalized, the 
opposite point of view has been far less conceptualized. Populist parties have begun to reframe 
not just political rights but also social and economic rights as exclusive rights for cultural and/or 
ethnic members of that particular nation state. Some call this development the rise of welfare 
chauvinism where radical right-wing parties become supporters of the welfare state (Betz and 
Johnson 2004; Evans et al. 2001).This attitude is responsible for much of the resentment of the 
host society against immigrants insofar as they are perceived to ‘take away jobs, housing, and 
social services’ (Faist 1994: 440). The new rightist discourse therefore argues that social policy 
should be directly linked with an ethnic and sovereign nation state.   
 We can therefore identify a narrative that pivots around the concepts of welfare and the 
nation state. In the case of both parties it is possible to identify a strong class-based argument 
about the importance of the welfare state and the redistributive mechanisms that is aligns with. In 
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other words, there is a particular language of social and economic rights attached to the populism 
of True Finns and Sweden Democrats that aims to protect the rights of the native working 
classes, who are identified as the group who have lost the most as a consequence of globalization 
and open borders. This, in sum, is the logic and narrative of the welfare nation state that guides 
the agenda of the Nordic populist right. 
 
Conclusion 
 
From a conceptual point of view this paper has argued that it is helpful to consider the discourse 
of the Finnish and Swedish populist parties from the perspective of welfare nation state. The 
contemporary welfare state is commonly framed in terms of the social and economic rights that it 
confers to its citizens. Populist parties are reframing the Swedish welfare from a universal and 
egalitarian citizenship discourse through the lens of the nation state. The populist rhetoric re-
confers social rights as belonging to the membership of a particular community, narrowing and 
strengthening the boundaries of belonging, and establishing more effective controls around this. 
However, whilst the rules of exclusion and inclusion are strengthened, the social and economic 
rights of those within the community are enhanced. In other words, the populist ideology is also 
strongly attached to progressive notions of equity and improved mechanisms of redistribution.  
 This approach sits uneasily among the multicultural, interconnected and increasingly 
global set of institutions and networks that the modern nation-state finds itself in. For this reason 
the language of limited national community of citizens is accompanied by strengthened notions 
of nation state sovereignty. It is in this way that the present-day populist discourse weaves 
together social and economic rights, nationalism and sovereignty. The evidence presented in this 
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article suggests that such framing of the rhetoric of the welfare nation state is something that 
both the Finnish and Swedish populist right wing parties share. 
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